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Abstract
This paper reports on the results of a series of experimental laboratory elections. The
novelty of the design allows me to study both coordination failures and coordination eﬃ-
ciency in a repeated-game, divided majority setting. I assess and compare the performance
of three voting mechanisms, Approval Voting, Borda Count, and Plurality Voting under
two information structures. Voters either know the preference structure in the electorate
or hold no information regarding other voters' preferences. With enough experience, the
majority is frequently able to solve the coordination problem and coordination failure rates
are fairly low across voting methods and information structures. The multi-vote systems
Approval Voting and Borda Count dissolve information imperfections eﬀectively and al-
low the majority to coordinate eﬃciently, independently of the underlying information
structure. The level of coordination eﬃciency under Plurality Voting crucially depends on
available information. When voters are uninformed about the preference structure in the
electorate, the majority frequently fails to implement the eﬃcient outcome. This low level
of coordination eﬃciency is costly and decreases total welfare.
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1 Introduction
In divided majority problems (DMPs) a majority of voters is divided in their support between
several similarly appealing alternatives (parties, candidates, etc). If the majority is split, a
socially undesirable alternative, preferred by the minority, will win the election. Such an alter-
native constitutes a Condorcet loser, an alternative that is defeated by every other alternative
in a pairwise race (a Condorcet winner is able to defeat every other alternative in a two-way
race, see e.g. Black, 1958, for a discussion of both concepts). Failures to defeat the Condorcet
loser in DMPs pose a major threat for democratic practice as they compromise the wishes of
the voters. They derail the democratic process by undermining the legitimacy of appointed
leaders.1
Voting mechanisms should satisfactorily deal with two important issues in the context of
DMPs. First, they should facilitate coordination by allowing the majority to suﬃciently con-
centrate their votes behind one single alternative. Second, they should promote coordination
on the best among several running alternatives. While the existing literature on DMPs has
primarily focused on the ﬁrst issue (see, e.g., Forsythe et al., 1996; Gerber et al., 1998; Morton
and Rietz, 2007), the second motive has received only little attention thus far and is typically
overlooked (Bouton and Castanheira, 2012; Bouton et al., 2015, form a notable exception).
The aim of this paper is to bridge this gap and investigate the extent to which diﬀerent voting
mechanisms impact coordination eﬃciency. Speciﬁcally, I assess and compare the performance
of three voting mechanisms, Approval Voting (AV), Borda Count (BC), and Plurality Voting
(PV) in a series of laboratory elections. AV and BC are multi-vote methods which oﬀer voters
additional opportunities to express their preferences. The design of the experiment introduces
two important novelties with regard to existing literature. First, I study a novel, repeated-
game DMP setting in which the majority has three alternatives to coordinate on. However,
one of the alternatives is clearly the most desirable one: it constitutes a unique Condorcet
winner maximizing total surplus for society. Second, I consider an information structure where
voters only observe past election outcomes and do not know the preference distribution in
the electorate. The central question that I investigate is how information about other voters'
preferences aﬀects the majority's ability to coordinate on the eﬃcient Condorcet winner.
Abundant evidence suggests that voters display a low level of informedness about politics
and eligible candidates (Sears and Kinder, 1985). They rely on other sources of the electoral
process (e.g., polls, media coverage, campaign spending) to procure enough information to
guide their choices (e.g. Wittman, 1989; Lau and Redlawsk, 1997; Sinclair and Plott, 2012).
The electoral process itself is driven by the voting mechanism employed and focuses on the
alternatives expected to do well. These alternatives will perform well in polls, attract the
attention of the media, and gather more funds for their campaigns. Thus, if voting mechanisms
tend to favor polarizing choices over consensus options, compromise alternatives who share
a broad support in the electorate might go unnoticed to the public. The presence of this
link between voting mechanisms and the electoral process implies that, even for a ﬁxed set of
preferences, diﬀerent voting mechanisms can give rise to diﬀerent sets of viable alternatives.2
1 Coordination failures in DMPs have been frequently observed in elections based on or involving Plurality
Voting. The United States Presidential Election in 1912 (analyzed in Riker, 1982) is one of many infamous
examples. Failing to receive the Republican nomination, former president Theodore Roosevelt created the
Progressive Party and was chosen as its presidential nominee. The split in the Republican vote made it possible
for Democratic Party nominee Woodrow Wilson to win a number of states that had been reliably Republican.
Incumbent and Republican nominee William H. Taft (popular vote: 24%) and Roosevelt (27%) lost the election
to Wilson (42%). Although an absolute majority of voters preferred any of the two other major candidates, the
Republican split allowed Wilson to secure 82% of the electoral vote. See Myatt (2007) for a discussion of the
1997 UK general elections, Forsythe et al. (1993) for a discussion of the 1970 U.S. Senate election in New York
State, and Bouton and Castanheira (2012) for a discussion of the US presidential election of 2000 in Florida.
2 A series of large-scale ﬁeld experiments on alternative voting mechanisms has recently demonstrated
that, once voters are allowed to cast multiple votes, they reveal to be interested in alternatives that were
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The main results of the experiment are as follows. With enough experience, voters are able
to solve the coordination problem in the sense that coordination failure rates are low. This holds
true irrespective of the voting mechanism employed. However, even with experience, successful
coordination on the eﬃcient Condorcet winner does depend on the voting mechanism and the
underlying information structure. With full knowledge about the preference structure in the
electorate coordination mainly takes place on the unique Condorcet winner. Without such
information, voters under AV and BC still manage to coordinate on the Condorcet winner at
high rates, but fail to do so under PV. Multi-vote systems positively impact the electoral process
by enlarging the set of viable alternatives. Coordination on the Condorcet winner breaks down
under PV and almost never occurs if information about others' preferences is not available.
Failures to recognize the Condorcet winner as a viable option under PV are associated with a
welfare loss in terms of total surplus generated in the voting groups.
The paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. It provides strong evidence
that the performance of voting mechanisms in DMPs should not only be judged on their ability
to avoid coordination failures (i.e., defeat the Condorcet loser) but should also incorporate the
extent to which they promote eﬃcient coordination (i.e., elect the Condorcet winner). This is
an important issue that has been ignored in the literature so far. Furthermore, the experiment
provides robustness results for previous ﬁndings in the literature. Knowledge about other
voters' preferences is not necessarily needed to defeat the Condorcet loser in the presence of
repeated interaction (Forsythe et al., 1996). This observation conforms to the idea that the
electoral process itself provides voters with institutions that allow them to make good decisions
despite their low level of informdeness (Wittman, 1989; Lau and Redlawsk, 1997; Page and
Shapiro, 2010). However, repeated interaction may not promote eﬃcient coordination under
PV. The electoral process under multi-votes systems allows voters to make better decisions
despite their low level of informdeness.
On a more general level, the main ﬁndings in this paper suggest that diﬀerent speciﬁcations
of the underlying information structure should be taken into account when evaluating the
performance of voting methods. If we want to improve collective decision making we should
think about ways to improve the informational basis of the electorate. Adopting alternative
voting mechanisms could be one way. However, proposals for changes in the electoral systems
are often met with reluctance. They require a massive eﬀort to mobilize voter masses so that
change may be eﬀectuated. So, if actual electoral reforms are hard to implement from a practical
point of view, an easy way to improve the informational basis of the electorate that would be
met with less resistance is to change the information technology. Instead of using PV for polls
in PV based elections, societies could simply adopt AV or BC as polling technologies to better
inform the electorate (Potthoﬀ, 2011).
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
background and experimental hypotheses. Section 3 presents the design and the procedures of
the experiment. Section 4 contains the experiment's results and is sub-divided along the main
research questions. Section 5 ﬁnally concludes.
ignored in the corresponding oﬃcial, PV-based elections (Laslier and Van der Straeten, 2008; Alós-Ferrer and
Grani¢, 2010; Baujard and Igersheim, 2010; Alós-Ferrer and Grani¢, 2012; Baujard et al., 2014). For example, a
diﬀerent winner would have emerged if AV had been used instead of the oﬃcial ﬁrst-past-the-post system in the
Constituency Vote for the German Federal Elections in 2009 in the district Konstanz (Alós-Ferrer and Grani¢,
2012). The AV winner, who was approved of by an absolute majority of voters, was only a minor contender
in the oﬃcial election and came in third. The candidate that came in fourth in the ﬁrst round of the French
Presidential election in 2002 was, ﬁltered through the lens of the oﬃcial one man, one vote voting rule, only a
minor contender. Again, AV revealed that the support in the electorate for this particular candidate was much
larger than suggested by the oﬃcial results and comparable in magnitude to the approval rate of the oﬃcial
runner-up (Laslier and Van der Straeten, 2008).
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Table 1: Payoﬀ schedule and induced preference proﬁle.
Voter Payoﬀs in ECU
Type Number A B C D Induced Preferences
Type I 2 100 40 60 80 A  D  C  B
Type II 3 40 100 60 80 B  D  C  A
Type III 2 60 40 100 80 C  D  A  B
2 Theoretical background and hypotheses
2.1 The voting game
The experiment employs a voting game with four available alternatives (neutrally labeled A,
B, C, and D) and three diﬀerent types of voters. The underlying payoﬀ schedule in terms
of experimental currency units (ECU) as well as the corresponding induced strict preferences
over the set of alternatives are summarized in Table 1. Seven participants form one group in
which voting takes place. The group consists of two voters (Type I) with preferences A 
D  C  B, three voters (Type II) with preferences B  D  C  A and two voters (Type
III) with preferences C  D  A  B, where  denotes the usual strict preference relation.
Participants submit their ballots anonymously and independently and the winner of the election
is determined according to a pre-speciﬁed voting method (AV, BC, or PV).
The dynamic electoral process is modeled through a repeated game with the voting game
represented in Table 1 as the stage game. Participants participate in a series of eight elections
keeping constant the group composition and induced preferences. This design explicitly allows
participants to interact with each other over several rounds allowing them to form expectations
and to develop strategies based on their group's common history. An analogous design was
used in Forsythe et al. (1993) and Forsythe et al. (1996) to study the dynamics of the electoral
process. The next section provides a more detailed motivation for this particular design.
Preferences in the electorate are characterized by a minority of three voters strictly preferring
alternative B to all other alternatives. However, alternative B is a (strict) Condorcet loser and
constitutes the worst possible outcome for an absolute majority of four voters. In order to avoid
their worst outcome, the majority of voters has to coordinate their votes. Although never at the
top of any individual's preferences, a natural candidate for coordination should be alternative
D, the unique Condorcet winner. The preference proﬁle was carefully chosen to align many
desirable criteria and having them point to a single alternative. D is not only the Condorcet
winner, it is also the winning alternative under BC if everybody votes sincerely and maximizes
total payoﬀs.3 The presentation of the game-theoretic analysis of the one-shot voting game is
omitted here and can be found in the supplementary online materials. There exists a plethora
of Nash equilibrium even after applying an equilibrium reﬁnement like iterative elimination of
weakly dominated strategies. Each of the four alternatives can be sustained as the outcome of
at least one Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle under BC. The same is true for alternatives A,
C, and D under AV and PV.
3 If D wins an election, voting groups reach a welfare level of 560 ECUs. Voting groups reach a welfare level
of 500 ECU if C wins, 460 if B wins, and 440 if A wins. Successful coordination on D, hence, maximizes total
group payoﬀs and implementations of A lead to the least eﬃcient outcome for the group.
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2.2 Motivation and main research questions
The starting point for most of the existing literature on DMPs is a simple election model with
one minority alternative, two similarly appealing majority alternatives, and publicly known
preferences (i.e., voters are fully informed about the preference structure in the whole elec-
torate). The minority-preferred alternative constitutes a Condorcet loser and the split-majority
needs to coordinate in order to defeat the Condorcet loser. This simple DMPmodel has sprouted
a large body of research on how diﬀerent voting and coordination mechanisms impact coordi-
nation failure between the majority blocks. Several studies have established the superiority of
alternative voting mechanisms over PV demonstrating that they eﬀectively reduce the probabil-
ity of electing Condorcet losers in DMPs (Forsythe et al., 1996; Gerber et al., 1998; Morton and
Rietz, 2007; Bouton and Castanheira, 2012; Bouton et al., 2015). Yet, the severity to which PV
is aicted by coordination failures might crucially depend on the availability of other processes
to obtain information from. Coordination devices readily available to the public like polls and
campaign spending or shared election histories (Forsythe et al., 1993, 1996; Rietz et al., 1998;
Andonie and Kuzmics, 2012) are consistently shown to increase the rate of tacit coordination of
the split-majority. Public, pre-election information essentially allow voters to form expectations
about the viability of alternatives and to provide optimal responses to avoid bad outcomes.
Investigating the extent to which diﬀerent mechanisms uncover viable options in a DMP
setting requires two major novelties in the design in comparison to the basic model. First, one
needs to make sure that a unique, socially, and normatively desirable alternative exists. This
is the role that alternative D assumes, see Table 1. Second, one needs a dynamic set-up of
electoral competition in which no a priori information about the desirability of alternatives is
given to the voters. Voters discover or fail to discover the desirability and viability of the four
alternatives through the electoral process itself. A departure from publicly known preferences
to a more realistic information setting can enrich our understanding of why PV is especially
prone to DMPs. Without proper information regarding the preference proﬁle in the electorate,
voters might not recognize that they actually face a DMP or might not be able to identify
viable alternatives to coordinate upon.
How can voting mechanisms aﬀect or ﬁlter the set of viable alternatives if the electoral
process oﬀers voters a plethora of sources to gather information from? How can socially desirable
options slip through this ﬁne-gridded net of information provision? As noted by Cox (1997,
p. 7), Contributors do not contribute, activists do not volunteer for, and citizens do not vote
for hopeless candidates, ensuring that those expected to do poorly, do poorly in fact. This
observation is conforming to Duverger's (1954) claims that electoral systems have systematic
eﬀects on the structure and dynamics of electoral competition. If voting mechanism like PV for
whatever reason tend to favor alternatives that constitute the most preferred alternatives for
some voters, like A, B, and C in Table 1, the electoral process is also going to focus on these
alternatives. The alternatives expected to do well will attract the attention of the media, will
gather funds for their campaigns, and will perform well in polls. Compromise alternatives like
D who share a broad support in the electorate but are not at the top of the voters' preferences
might go unnoticed to the public.
Multi-vote methods oﬀer voters additional opportunities to express their wishes and desires.
They address one of the core mechanism behind any DMP by design: A majority of voters
that are divided between similar ideologically motivated alternatives can cast supporting votes
for more than one alternative. They possess the potential to positively impact the electoral
process by enlarging the set of viable alternatives. Two of the most promising candidates, both
in terms of scientiﬁc work devoted to their study and the many positive (desirable) properties
they exhibit, are AV and BC. AV, ﬁrst analytically described in Brams and Fishburn (1978),
merely requires voters to reveal which alternatives they ﬁnd `acceptable'. Each voter only needs
to mark the names of the alternatives he approves of. Arguments distilled from the literature
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in favor of AV are that the method provides an accurate reﬂection of voters' wishes and is not
vulnerable to voter manipulation (see Brams and Fishburn, 1978; Fishburn, 1978a,b; Myerson,
2002; Brams and Fishburn, 2005; Wolitzky, 2009). Instead of collecting binary information
regarding each alternative, BC requires voters to provide a complete ranking (see de Borda,
1781; Saari, 1994). BC minimizes the amount of paradoxes within the set of positional voting
methods (including PV) and the alternative winning BC elections when voters act sincerely
is the alternative ranked highest on average in the electorate (see Saari, 1994). Currently,
neither of the two methods is used in any major oﬃcial election. If we want to understand the
implications of alternative voting methods for society, it is essential to collect empirical data
on their performance.4
2.3 Hypotheses
The hypotheses derived in this section revolve around the central idea of viability: voters
base their decision for whom to vote for on the attractiveness of alternatives (i.e. voters'
preferences) as well as on the alternatives' perceived chances of winning (Cox, 1997; Alvarez
and Nagler, 2000; Van der Straeten et al., 2010; Blais et al., 2011).5 With publicly known
preferences, previous research shows that coordination devices like polls or election histories
under PV and multi-vote systems like AV and BC reduce coordination failure rates below 50%
in comparison to coordination failure rates above 50% under PV in the absence of coordination
devices (e.g. Forsythe et al., 1993, 1996; Morton and Rietz, 2007). Moreover, coordination
failure decreases over time in settings with shared election histories under PV (Forsythe et al.,
1993, 1996). For the preference proﬁle studied here the Condorcet winner increases the salience
of coordination facilitating coordination among the majority. While coordination on A or C
induces asymmetric payoﬀ consequences between the two majority blocks, coordination on D
should be a natural focal point as every voter is equally well oﬀ. Social preferences, equity, and
eﬃciency concerns further increase the attractiveness of D. Hence, the viability of D is very
high with full information irrespective of the voting mechanism. These reﬂections lead to the
following hypothesis.
H1. With publicly known preferences coordination failures occur less frequently than successful
coordination irrespective of the voting mechanism used (possibly after accounting for learning
eﬀects under PV). Coordination failures decrease over time under PV. The viability of the
Condorcet winner is high and coordination mainly takes place on D irrespective of the voting
mechanism used (possibly after accounting for learning eﬀects under PV).
What are the most likely consequences of having no information regarding other voters'
preferences under the preference conﬁguration from Table 1 and a dynamic electoral process
mimicked by a repeated game setting? Note that there is no informational basis for voters to
act in a speciﬁc, clever way other than election histories. In the absence of common histories,
like in the ﬁrst election of the electoral process, voters can be presumed to vote sincerely (see,
e.g., Merrill and Nagel, 1987). Sincere behavior in combination with the relatively low level
of information transmitted through a PV ballot should make the Condorcet winner disappear
under PV. Nobody votes for D, there is no recorded ballot cast in favor of D and the relatively
strong support of D in the electorate goes unnoticed. The viability of D decreases dramatically.
4 Field experiments are an important tool in this direction. Unfortunately, the lack of control over partici-
pants' preferences makes it impossible to study properties of voting methods outside of the political context in
which ﬁeld experiments are conducted.
5 Viability does not imply that voters actually maximize expected utility based on pivot probabilities as in
voting theories based on rational choice theory (e.g. Myerson and Weber, 1993). Voters can also follow simple
heuristics. The top-two heuristic describes in Van der Straeten et al. (2010) is one example. Under the top-two
heuristic voters form a believe about the two most promising alternatives in terms of chances of winning and
simply vote for the alternative they prefer.
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Failures to elect D will decrease total surplus in the voting groups. These considerations lead
to my next hypothesis.
H2. No information regarding other voters' preferences decreases the viability of the Con-
dorcet winner under PV. The low viability leads to a decrease in the winning frequencies of
the Condorcet winner under PV in comparison to the corresponding winning frequencies with
full information. The decrease in winning frequencies leads to an overall loss in total surplus
generated.
At the same time, the underlying information structure should have only a small eﬀect on
the election outcomes generated under AV and BC since sincere strategies include casting votes
for the Condorcet winner. Participants in ﬁeld experiments studying AV, for example, often
use the additional opportunities oﬀered to express their preferences and cast multiple approvals
(see e.g. Alós-Ferrer and Grani¢, 2012). If everybody votes sincerely under BC, D emerges as
the winner. Even if participants do not recognize that they actually face a DMP, the votes
recorded in favor of D in past elections should transmit enough information about the social
attractiveness of D. Despite participants' not being informed about D maximizing total surplus
or constituting a fair compromise for the majority, the Condorcet winner should still be a
viable option. In light of hypothesis H2, where a sharp decrease in the winning frequencies of
D is expected under PV, I derive the following hypothesis.
H3. No information regarding other voters' preferences does not decrease the viability of the
Condorcet winner to the same extent under AV or BC as it does under PV. The winning
frequencies of the Condorcet winner as well as total surplus in the voting groups are higher
under AV and BC than under PV when voters have no information regarding other voters'
preferences.
3 Experimental design
The experimental laboratory elections were run at the Lakelab (University of Konstanz, Ger-
many). The experimental design, based on Forsythe et al. (1993) and Forsythe et al. (1996),
followed a 3 between (voting method: AV vs. BC vs. PV) × 2 between (informational structure:
full-info vs. no-info) design. Preferences over alternatives were induced by means of monetary
incentives conditioning participants' remuneration on the outcome of the election. All elections
involved four available alternatives and any ties between two or more alternatives were bro-
ken randomly. In the full information (FI) treatments, all participants were informed about
the preference proﬁle of the electorate and the complete history of past elections. In the no
information (NI) treatments, participants only knew their own preferences and past election
outcomes. Under AV, participants could approve of as many alternatives as wished. The total
number of approvals determined the ultimate winner. Under BC, each voters assigned 3, 2, 1,
and 0 points to the alternatives. The alternative with the most points was declared winner.
Under PV, participants gave their vote to one alternative only, and the winner was determined
by the absolute number of votes received. For each election, participants submitted their voting
ballots anonymously and independently and the winner of the election was determined accord-
ing to the pre-speciﬁed voting method. Abstention, including the cast of empty ballots, was
not allowed.6 To economize notation henceforth, we refer to the six diﬀerent treatments by
6 Under AV, approving of all alternatives is equivalent to abstention and participants were allowed to cast
of such ballots. This creates a potential asymmetry, however, participants rarely used this strategy (only 97
of 2688 ballots, approx. 3.6%). The majority of such ballots can be either classiﬁed as errors (used once or
twice and then never again) or had no payoﬀ consequences (very large winning margins in current and previous
elections). The inﬂuence of this asymmetry on the results should be minimal to non-existent.
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abbreviating the corresponding voting method and information treatment, e.g. AVNI refers to
the Approval Voting, no information treatment.
3.1 Procedures
A total of 12 sessions (two per treatment) were run with 28 participants in each session for
a total of 336 participants. Upon arrival, participants were seated in computer-equipped and
isolated cubicles. In each session, participants were randomly allocated to four diﬀerent groups
of equal size and a random draw determined the voter `type' for each participant. During
each round of the experiment, one election was held within each group. At the end of each
election participants were informed about the outcome of the election and the money they
earned in this round. Participants were never directly confronted with the cash equivalents
they could win. All payoﬀs were presented in terms of Experimental Currency Units (ECU)
and converted at the end of the experiment at a ﬁxed rate (100 ECU were worth 60 Euro
cents). The group composition and the induced preference proﬁles were held ﬁxed for a series
of eight election rounds. After eight election rounds participants were rematched into new
groups and a `new' set of preferences was induced. For this purpose the computer reshued
the labels of the alternatives and randomly reassigned the `types' of the voters. Additionally,
small perturbations on the payoﬀ scheme were introduced before the start of the experiment and
after regrouping participants.7 The regrouping procedure preserved the ordinal structure of the
preference proﬁle, so that the overall design was unchanged, but every voter faced a qualitatively
new situation. The overall procedure allowed us to observe several diﬀerent groups within one
session while, at the same time, minimizing any repeated game eﬀect that could occur across
groups. Each participant completed three series of eight elections and 4 × 8 × 3 = 96 election
were held in each session. Thus, each treatment comprises 192 elections held in 24 groups with
1344 ballots cast.8
Participants were recruited from a student pool using the online recruitment system for eco-
nomic experiments (Greiner, 2004) excluding students from related ﬁelds with basic knowledge
in Game Theory and Social Choice Theory (Economics, Political Science, etc). The experiment
was run using the computer software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Sessions lasted approximately
1h, no show-up fee was paid, and the average remuneration was e10.66.
4 Experimental results
For the presentation of the experiment's results the labels of the alternatives match the orig-
inal preference proﬁle as presented in Table 1. Alternative B represents the Condorcet loser
and alternative D the Condorcet winner. Due to the rematching procedure, fully statistical
independence is at hand only for the ﬁrst four groups in each session. The procedure itself is
carefully designed to minimize repeated game eﬀects across series of elections. Thus, the other
groups can be considered `largely' independent. We follow the customary practice in the exist-
ing literature and treat every voting group as an independent observation (for papers in related
settings using the same rematching procedure see, e.g., Forsythe et al., 1993, 1996; Gerber et al.,
1998; Morton and Rietz, 2007). The main ﬁndings are not aﬀected by this particular choice and
also obtain for the subset of data of ﬁrst series elections. The corresponding tests can be found
7For each entry in the payoﬀ-matrix, the roll of a ten-sided die determined the direction and the amount
of the payoﬀ perturbation. For outcomes from 6 to 10, we added 1 to 5 ECU to and for outcomes 5 to 1, we
subtracted 1 to 5 ECU from the corresponding payoﬀs in Table 1.
8 Due to a computer error, a diﬀerent preference proﬁle was induced in the second series of the ﬁrst session of
the PVFI treatment and the data from this series is excluded from the analysis. This treatment thus comprises
160 elections in 20 groups with 1120 ballots.
8
Figure 1: The fraction of elections won in each of the six treatments.
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Note: The percentages are rounded and may not add up to 100%. Alternative D is the Condorcet winner,
alternative B the Condorcet loser. Number of elections per treatment: 192 (except PVFI: 128).
in the online supplementary materials. Given that we run two sessions per treatment, we have
N = 24 independent observations per treatment (4 groups per series × 3 series × 2 sessions per
treatment) except for PVFI where we have N = 20 independent observations (see Footnote 8).
In case there is no clear a priori hypothesis about the direction of an eﬀect, two-sided versions
of the tests are adopted.
4.1 Summary of election results
Before investigating the main hypotheses, Figure 1 presents the aggregated election results for
all six treatments in terms of fraction of elections won by each of the four alternatives. In case
of a tie among k alternatives I treated each alternative in the winner-set as having won the kth
fraction of an election.9
As shown in Figure 1, electoral contestation mainly takes place on the Condorcet winner
and the Condorcet loser. Alternatives A and C, except for the PVNI treatment, display low
winning frequencies (≤ 14%). Alternative D is the strongest alternative, winning the most
elections under AV and BC, regardless of the underlying information structure, and as well as
in PVFI. The ﬁgures range from 54% in PVFI to 75% in AVFI. Coordination on D breaks down
from 54% in PVFI to marginal 9% in PVNI. On average, the multi-vote systems are equally
eﬃcient in electing the Condorcet winner and are more eﬃcient than PV. The Condorcet loser
B obtains its highest winning frequencies among all treatments in PV-based elections with 47%
in PVNI and 35% in PVFI, respectively. Multi-vote systems, hence, are also on average more
eﬀective than PV in solving the coordination problem faced by the majority blocks. Under
BC, the Condorcet loser only wins 7% of the elections under FI and 9% of the elections under
NI, respectively. Under AV, alternative B wins 17% of the elections under FI and 24% of the
elections under NI, respectively. A more detailed account of the election results is given in the
tables in Appendix A and the online supplementary materials.
9 Notwithstanding the relatively small group size in the experiment, a vast majority of election outcomes
are non-tied. Percentage of non-tied elections in the diﬀerent treatments: AVFI - 72%; AVNI - 65%; BCFI -
86%; BCNI - 83%; PVFI - 74%; PVNI - 69%.
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Figure 2: Coordination failure rates and Condorcet eﬃciency with full information over the course of
the experiment.
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Note: Coordination failure rates are measured as the fraction of elections won by the Condorcet loser. Coordi-
nation eﬃciency is measured as the fraction of elections won by the Condorcet winner. Periods 1 to 8 correspond
to the ﬁrst series, periods 9 to 16 to the second series, and 17 to 24 to the third series of elections.
4.2 The full information treatments
The top panel in Figure 2 shows the fraction of elections won by the Condorcet loser B (coordi-
nation failure rates) and the bottom panel shows the fraction of elections won by the Condorcet
winner D (Condorcet eﬃciency rates) over the course of the experiment for the FI treatments.
Elections are labeled consecutively from 1 to 24. Period 6 is the sixth election of the ﬁrst series,
period 9 is the ﬁrst election of the second series and so on. The vertical lines separate the three
series of elections.
As a ﬁrst approach to hypotheses H1, notice that coordination failure rates are systemati-
cally below 50% for all three voting methods. This observation is statistically corroborated by
a series of one-sided Wilcoxon-Signed-Rank (WSR) tests. Calculating the coordination failure
rates for each voting group, we test the null-hypothesis that the median failure rate is greater or
equal to 50%. We reject the null-hypothesis for all three voting mechanisms on the conventional
10
levels of signiﬁcance in favor of the alternative hypothesis of failure rates smaller than 50%.10
Figure 2 further reveals a clear trend in the way coordination failures evolve over time
under PV. Coordination failure rates are declining within each series. They decrease from 51%
in the ﬁrst elections within series to 23% in the last elections within series. This observation is
statistically corroborated by the result of Cuzick's trend test (Cuzick, 1985). Calculating the
coordination failure rates for each period in the experiment, we test the null-hypothesis that
there is no trend in coordination failure rates within series of elections. In doing so, we do not
discriminate between series in the sense that every series is treated as an independent process
starting with its ﬁrst election (election period 1) and terminating with its last one (election
period 8). We reject the null-hypotheses in favor of the alternative hypothesis of declining
failure rates on the conventional levels of signiﬁcance (N = 24, Z = −3.19, p = 0.001).
The bottom panel in Figure 2 shows that D is highly salient. The Condorcet winner
wins a considerable number of elections for all three voting mechanisms. As hypothesized,
coordination mainly takes place on D. The results of a series of one-sided WSR tests conﬁrm
these observations statistically. For each voting group, we calculate the diﬀerence in winning
frequencies between alternatives A and C combined, and alternative D. Diﬀerences larger than
zero indicate higher rates of coordination on alternatives A and C. We conduct a WSR test
with the null-hypothesis that the median diﬀerence is larger or equal to zero for each voting
mechanism separately. The corresponding null-hypothesizes are rejected for all three tests on
the conventional levels of signiﬁcance signifying that coordination mainly takes place on the
Condorcet winner.11
The results of the statistical analysis conﬁrm hypothesis H1. Importantly, these results
establish the comparability of the new approach investigated in this paper with the existing
literature which reports low failure rates for AV, BC, and PV and pronounced learning eﬀects
under PV. Finally, the high rate of coordination on D validates the general approach. D is
a highly salient, and highly desirable alternative on which the voting groups voluntarily and
readily coordinate on.
This sections concludes with some ﬁnal remarks regarding diﬀerences between voting mech-
anism and the implications of these diﬀerences on total welfare. The diﬀerences in terms of
coordination failure rates and Condorcet eﬃciency rates discussed in Section 4.1 are mainly
driven by what happens in the early rounds. Figure 2 illustrates that if we consider later
rounds, we ﬁnd that coordination failure rates and Condorcet eﬃciency rates are of compara-
ble magnitude across all three voting mechanisms. Especially in the third series, diﬀerences
between methods are almost non-existent. For example, the median failure rate over voting
groups for the last six elections in the third series is 11%, 0%, and 17% for AV, BC, and PV,
respectively. In comparison, the median failure rate over voting groups including all elections is
11%, 4%, and 33% for AV, BC, and PV, respectively. A similar picture emerges for Condorcet
eﬃciency rates.12 These observations are also reﬂected in the analysis of total welfare, measured
as total surplus of ECU generated in each voting group. D maximizes total welfare. If D wins
10 AVFI: N = 24, Z = 4.23, p < 0.001 (median = 0.114, mean = 0.172, stdev = 0.165); BCFI: N = 24,
Z = 4.33, p < 0.001 (median = 0.042, mean = 0.066, stdev = 0.092); PVFI: N = 20, Z = 2.43, p = 0.007
(median = 0.333, mean = 0.349, stdev = 0.231).
11 AVFI: N = 24, Z = −4.29, p < 0.001 (diﬀerence in winning frequencies between (A,C) and D: median =
−0.686, mean = −0.666, stdev = 0.217); BCFI: N = 24, Z = −3.95, p < 0.001 (median = −0.625, mean =
−0.534, stdev = 0.391); PVFI: N = 20, Z = −3.16, p < 0.001 (median = −0.531, mean = −0.422, stdev =
0.423).
12 A series of two-sided Kruskal-Wallis (KW) tests conﬁrm these observations. Diﬀerences between voting
mechanisms in terms of coordination failure rates / Condorcet eﬃciency rates are statistically signiﬁcant con-
sidering the entire data set, however, disappear if we restrict the data to the last six elections of the third series.
Coordination failure rates: entire data set - N = 68, χ2 = 20.13, p < 0.001; last six elections in series three -
N = 24, χ2 = 3.04, p = 0.229. Condorcet eﬃciency: entire data set - N = 68, χ2 = 6.74, p = 0.030, median
AV=73%, BC=81%, PV=61%; last six elections in series three - N = 24, χ2 = 0.524, p = 0.786, median
AV=78%, BC=88%, PV=83%.
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an election, a voting group reaches a welfare level of 560 ECUs (500 ECU if C wins, 460 if B
wins, and 440 if A wins). The median welfare level reached per voting group per election is
533.2 under AV (mean = 529.5, stdev = 13.1), 531.9 under BC (mean = 528.2, stdev = 14.8),
and 512 under PV (mean = 506.1, stdev = 27.9). Diﬀerences in welfare levels across voting
mechanisms are statistically signiﬁcant according to a two-sided KW test (N = 68, χ2 = 10.5,
p = 0.004). Restricting the data to the very last series of elections, the median welfare level
reached per voting group per election is 527.9 under AV (mean = 526.5, stdev = 11.5), 532.8
under BC (mean = 533.4, stdev = 5.3), and 512 under PV (mean = 513.7, stdev = 26.4).
There are no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in welfare levels across voting mechanisms ac-
cording to a two-sided KW test restricting the data to the third series of elections (N = 24,
χ2 = 2.67, p = 0.279).
4.3 The no information treatments and comparison across informa-
tion treatments
Figure 3 follows an analogous interpretation to that of Figure 2. The top panel shows the
coordination failure rates and the bottom panel shows the Condorcet eﬃciency rates over the
course of the experiment for the NI treatments. Elections are labeled consecutively from 1 to
24 and vertical lines separate the three series of elections.
Figure 3 shows that the Condorcet winner virtually disappears in PVNI. Eﬃciency rates are
systematically at low levels. Conﬁrmed by a one-sided WMW test, this huge decline in eﬃciency
rates between information treatments is statistically signiﬁcant at any conventional level of
conﬁdence (N = 44, Z = 4.71, p < 0.001) and is robust to learning eﬀects, e.g. considering
only the very last four elections within the third series (N = 16, Z = 2.30, p = 0.012).
Per voting group per election welfare levels are also signiﬁcantly lower under NI (N = 44,
Z = 3.24, p < 0.001). Median per election welfare level drops from 512 in PVFI (mean = 506.1,
stdev = 27.9) to 478.9 in PVNI (mean = 478.8, stdev = 18.1). This eﬀect is again robust
against accounting for learning eﬀects by considering the last four elections within the third
series only (N = 16, Z = 1.93, p = 0.029) where median per election welfare level drops from
533.3 under FI (mean = 520.3, stdev = 30.1) to 484.3 under NI (mean = 489.8, stdev = 33.0).
The statistical analysis conﬁrms hypothesis H2. Never being at the top of any participant's
preference proﬁle, the electoral process does not uncover the Condorcet winner as a viable option
to coordinate upon. The desirability and strong support in the electorate of the Condorcet
winner is only poorly transmitted. This ineﬃciency is costly for the society as a whole. The
shift in electoral competition away from the Condorcet winner towards alternatives A and C
mainly comes at the expenses of the Type II minority voters (average per election payoﬀ FI vs
NI for - Type I: 64.7 vs 62.2; - Type II: 82.6 vs 75.0; - Type II: 64.4 vs 64.7). The minority
would be better oﬀ with full information.
Figure 3 further reveals pronounced learning eﬀects under PV with high failure rates (>60%)
in the ﬁrst two elections within each series which drop to fairly low levels (<38%) in the
last elections within series (one-sided Cuzick's trend test: N = 24, Z = −4.04, p < 0.001).
Accounting for learning eﬀects by considering only the last four elections within series, there are
no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in coordination failure rates for PV between information
treatments according to a two-sided Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney Rank Sum (WMW) test (N =
44, Z = −0.44, p = 0.671). The median over voting groups failure rates in the last four
elections within series is 0.167 in PVFI (mean = 0.254, stddev = 0.258) and 0.313 in PVNI
(mean = 0.297, stddev = 0.278), respectively. Election histories alone transmit a suﬃcient
amount of information for the majority to frequently defeat the Condorcet loser,
Approaching hypothesis H3, we now turn to the discussion of diﬀerences between PV on
the one-hand and AV, and BC on the other. Figure 3 reveals that the superiority of AV and BC
12
Figure 3: Coordination eﬃciency over the course of the experiment.
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Note: Coordination eﬃciency is measured as the fraction of elections won by the Condorcet winner. Periods
1 to 8 correspond to the ﬁrst series, periods 9 to 16 to the second series, and 17 to 24 to the third series of
elections.
over PV in terms of lower failure rates observed in Section 4.1 is mainly driven by early election
rounds. The stark learning process under PV reduces failure rates to a comparable level to the
ones under AV and BC. This ﬁnding is supported by two-sided KW tests. There are statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between voting methods in terms of failure rates if we consider all data
(N = 72, χ2 = 42.24, p − value < 0.001) which, however, disappear if we restrict the data
to the last four elections of the third series (N = 24, χ2 = 3.59, p − value = 0.170). The
overall picture for Condorcet eﬃciency rates is quite diﬀerent. There is not a single election
round in which the Condorcet eﬃciency rate of PV is equal to or larger than the one of AV or
BC when participants can only observe past election histories. A series of pairwise, two-sided
WMW tests substantiates these observations. AV and BC are more eﬃcient than PV under NI.
These results are highly robust and obtain irrespective of the subset of data used for the test.
Especially, they obtain even after accounting for learning eﬀects by considering the last four
election within the third series of elections only.13 These pronounced diﬀerences in eﬃciency
13 Controlling for family-wise error rates, the p-values for pairwise tests reported are always adjusted according
to the Holm-Bonferroni method (see Siegel and Castellan, 1988). Two-sided tests are conducted here as no clear
13
rates between AV / BC and PV are also reﬂected in group welfare levels. Voting groups under
AV and BC reach signiﬁcantly higher per election welfare levels than voting groups under PV.14
Median welfare levels drop from 523.2 under AV (mean = 517.8, stdev = 18.8) and 531.6 under
BC (mean = 528.4, stdev = 11.4) to 478.9 under PV (mean = 478.8, stdev = 18.1).
The statistical analysis above strongly conﬁrms hypothesisH3. As hypothesized, multi-vote
methods like AV and BC, are more eﬃcient in resolving the coordination problem at the very
heart of DMPs and clearly outperform PV when information about other voters' preferences
is not present. Multi-vote systems dissolve information imperfections eﬀectively and election
results are relatively robust and stable under both information treatments in the experiment.
In contrast, information imperfections dramatically decrease the Condorcet eﬃciency of PV.
The experiment also highlights the importance of full information for coordination devices to
alleviate coordination problems in DMPs. The results demonstrate that repeated interaction as
a coordination device can promote coordination but might fail to do so eﬃciently in DMPs with
no information about other voters preferences under PV. Finally, the results suggest that, in
general, diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the underlying information structure and the responsiveness
of voting methods towards changes thereof should be taken into account when evaluating the
merits of voting methods.
4.4 Individual voting behavior
This section discusses the individual voting behavior underlying the aggregate election results.
A more detailed account on ballots cast in the experiment is given in Table 6 in Appendix A. AV
has been shown to provide few incentives to misrepresent one's preferences under many diﬀerent
circumstances both theoretically and empirically (see, e.g., Forsythe et al., 1996; Wolitzky,
2009; Dellis et al., 2011) and the experiment's results conﬁrm these ﬁndings.15 Even under the
highly strategic repeated game environment studied here, the most frequent ballots observed
are the sincere ones (87.3% in AVFI and 96.1% in AVNI). However, diﬀerent voter types display
heterogeneity in the distribution of ballots. Under FI (NI), Type I and Type III voters, with
relative frequencies of 45.3% (51.3%) and 52.1% (54.2%) respectively, approve of their two most
preferred alternatives more often than Type II voters, who do so with a relative frequency of
32.6% (28.6%). Type II voters on the other hand have the highest propensity to approve of
only their most preferred alternative B. They approve of only the Condorcet loser in 49.5%
(58.2%) of elections, in comparison to 19.3% (37.8%) of Type I voters approving only of A and
25.3% (28.4%) of Type III voters approving only of C. This pattern clearly reﬂects the diﬀerent
strategic considerations induced by the diﬀerent player roles. Type I and Type III voters try
to implement D and double vote often while Type II voters try to make B the winner and
often approve of B only. Diﬀerent voter types, hence, use diﬀerent types of sincere ballots.
One conclusion is that AV does not eliminate strategic considerations altogether. Due to the
multiplicity of sincere ballots, AV might shift the level of strategic consideration from `Which
ballot should I cast?' to `Which sincere ballot should I cast' (see Niemi, 1984; Nagel, 2007).
Voting behavior under PV reveals a strong eﬀect of underlying information. With knowledge
of the entire preference proﬁle under FI, Type I and Type III voters abandon their most
preferred alternative and vote for D in 66.6% and 54.7% of all elections, respectively. These
a priori hypothesis on the diﬀerence between AV and BC exists. Entire data set: AV vs BC -N = 48, Z = −1.84,
p = 0.066; AV vs PV - N = 48, Z = 5.728, p < 0.001; BC vs PV - N = 48, Z = 6.04, p < 0.001. Last four
election series three: AV vs BC - N = 16, Z = −2.30, p = 0.036; AV vs PV - N = 16, Z = 2.30, p = 0.020; BC
vs PV - N = 16, Z = 2.63, p = 0.021.
14 Pairwise, two-sided WMW: AV vs BC - N = 48, Z = −1.99, p = 0.023; AV vs PV - N = 48, Z = 5.09,
p < 0.001; BC vs PV - N = 48, Z = 5.88, p < 0.001.
15 Sincerity does not have a unique meaning under AV. As long as there are no holes in the ballot, votes
are considered sincere. Voters can approve of their top, top two, top three or top four alternatives. All these
ballots are in line with the voters' preferences and are considered sincere (Brams and Fishburn, 1978).
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ﬁgures decline to 10.7% and 10.4%, respectively, in the NI treatment and the number of sincere
ballots cast increases to a large extent. This in turn is the behavioral foundation of the observed
outcome patterns presented in earlier sections. Type I and Type III voters increase their
level of sincerity from 27.2% and 31.0% under FI, respectively, to 64.1% and 69.8% under NI,
respectively. We observe more coordination failures in early rounds and signiﬁcantly lower
Condorcet eﬃciency rates overall. The change in the underlying information structure also
triggered diﬀerent responses in majority and minority block voters. The majority block voters
try to coordinate on either A or C and increase their number of votes cast in favor of their third
most preferred alternatives under NI (from 4.1% to 24.2% for Type I voters and from 11.3%
to 18.2% for Type II voters, respectively). The minority block voters essentially use the same
strategy under FI as under NI and almost always vote for the Condorcet loser B (85.2% under
FI and 87.7% under NI). As hypothesized in Section 2.3, sincere behavior is largest in the ﬁrst
election within series under NI (Type I: 93.8%, Type II: 83.3%, Type III: 87.5%) and declines
over time.16
Concerning the BC elections, the sincere ballot was the ballot cast most frequently under
both information treatments (BCFI: 42.0%, BCNI: 46.5%). The second largest and third
largest ballot categories capture active strategic misrepresentation of preferences on part of the
voters. The ﬁrst of these two categories captures ballots allotting 3 points to the most preferred
alternative and more than zero points to the least preferred one. This strategy is known as
'burying' competing alternatives (BCFI: 21.8%, BCNI: 23.9%, see category TopWorst>0 in
Table 6). The second category, represents ballots assigning 3 points to alternative D. This
strategy is known as 'compromising' (BCFI: 25.1%, BCNI: 18.7%, see category Second in
Table 6). These two categories indicate the high amount of participants insincerely decreasing
alternatives and insincerely increasing alternatives in their ranking in order to change the
outcome of the election to their favor. BC is often criticized as being easy to manipulate
(Brams et al., 1988). The results here suggest that it is relatively easy for voters to understand
burying and compromising as means to manipulate the outcome to their favor. Given the
high Condorcet eﬃciency rate of BC, these simple heuristics cancel each other out in the
aggregate. As in the case of AV and PV, the diﬀerent types of voters display heterogeneity in
the distribution of ballots. However, the level of heterogeneity is by far not as pronounced as
under AV and diﬀerences between the two information treatments are rather small. The latter
observation supports the ﬁndings in Kube and Puppe (2009) who show that the amount of
available information has only little inﬂuence on the frequency of strategic votes under BC.
4.5 The importance of strategic considerations
Panel probit regressions with random eﬀects at the individual level further explore the factors
inﬂuencing individual behavior, see Table 2. The estimation results demonstrate that strategic
considerations were an important part of the decision making process in the experiment. They
uncover two main channels of strategic considerations and statistically conﬁrm the observations
on individual voting behavior from the previous section. By no means are these models meant
to be a complete description of individual voting data. They are a parsimonious, crisp way to
highlight the main ideas without unnecessarily complicating the exposition.
Each column in Table 2 corresponds to the regression analysis for one of the three voting
methods. Notice that each estimation includes the same set of regressors representing two
16 Under both AV and PV, the minority tends to adopt voting strategies that favor the Condorcet loser.
However, there is a substantial number of minority voters who double vote under AV supporting the Condorcet
loser as well as the Condorcet winner. At the same time minority voters under PV have a lower propensity to
give up their ﬁrst choice and vote for D. This inclusive feature of AV and exclusive feature of PV has been
observed both in the laboratory in the context of parochailism (Baron et al., 2005) as well as in a large scale
ﬁeld experiment conducted in parallel to the 2012 French presidential election (Baujard et al., 2014).
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Table 2: Panel probit estimates with random eﬀects at individual level.
AV BC PV
Dependent Variable: Top TopWorst>0 Sincere
Type II 0.781∗∗∗ 0.017 1.811∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.124) (0.154)
Type III 0.379∗∗∗ 0.253∗ 0.338∗∗
(0.143) (0.137) (0.160)
No Information 0.641∗∗∗ -0.120 1.340∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.198) (0.186)
No Information -0.392∗∗ 0.389∗∗ -1.507∗∗∗
× Type II (0.164) (0.178) (0.189)
No Information -0.342∗ 0.112 -0.116
× Type III (0.185) (0.192) (0.190)
Condorcet Loser t-1 -0.546∗∗∗ -0.444∗∗ 0.066
(0.129) (0.226) (0.112)
Condorcet Loser t-1 1.213∗∗∗ 0.905∗∗∗ 1.374∗∗∗
× Type II (0.161) (0.266) (0.185)
Condorcet Loser t-1 0.340∗ -0.335 -0.187
× Type III (0.176) (0.311) (0.159)
Constant -1.047∗∗∗ -1.056∗∗∗ -0.866∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.140) (0.145)
Number of Obs. 2688 2688 2464
Number of Groups 112 112 112
Log-Likelihood -1432 -1268 -1111
Wald Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: All dependent variables are dummies. Independent variables include dummies for the no information
treatment, Type II and Type III voters, and the Condorcet loser winning the previous election (zero if ﬁrst
round within a series). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Signiﬁcance is coded as: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
diﬀerent channels of strategic considerations. Given that participants were randomly assigned
to the treatments and voter types, systematic diﬀerences in the behavior between voter types for
a given voting method measure the adaptiveness of participants to the environment set by the
voting method and the underlying information structure. The ﬁrst channel, thus, represents
the strategic response in understanding the consequences of one's actions for a given voting
method and the respective link to the voter type (i.e., payoﬀ consequences). This channel is
measured by dummy variables for Type II voters, Type III voters, and for the NI treatment.
The regressions also include the interaction of these variables. The second channel investigated
here are the strategic responses of voters to available information in form of election histories.
Participants can use this information and react to the actions taken by the other voters in
the past, for example using myopic best-reply dynamics or simpler heuristics (Erev and Roth,
1998) or retrospective voting (Fiorina, 1981). They can also use this information and try to
predict the behavior of others and act accordingly like in models of rational choice (Myerson and
Weber, 1993; Myerson, 2000). In either way we should observe a strong link between election
histories and voting behavior. We measure this channel in a myopic way through the dummy
variable Condorcet loser t-1 which takes on the value 1 if the previous election was won by the
16
Condorcet loser.17
For each voting method we consider a diﬀerent dependent variable. For AV, the dependent
variable is the dummy Top which takes on the value 1 if voters approve of their most preferred
alternative only. The dummy TopWorst>0 is equal to 1 if voters assign 3 points to their most
preferred alternative and assign more than 0 points to their least preferred alternative under
BC. These ballots corresponds to the burying strategy, where voters assign a maximum number
of points to their preferred alternative, however insincerely lower the points of a less desirable,
probably competing alternative. For PV, the dummy Sincere takes on the value 1 if voters vote
for their most preferred alternative.
The results in Table 2 clearly reﬂect participants' self-interested, strategic responses through
the postulated channels. First, we observe signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the behavior between types.
With FI, the signiﬁcant Type II and Type III dummies indicate that Type II and Type III
voters have larger propensities to use Top and Sincere actions under AV and PV than Type I
voters. They also indicate that Type III voters have a higher propensity to cast burying ballots
than Type I voters under BC. Clearly, Type II voters from the minority block try to implement
B and, hence, use strategies that increase the probability of B winning the election to a greater
extent than Type I voters. How do we interpret the diﬀerence between Type III and Type I
voters? Remember that the induced preference proﬁle is asymmetric. Alternative A, the most
preferred alternative of Type I voters, is the least preferred alternative of the minority block.
Alternative C, the most preferred alternative of Type III voters, is the second worst option
for the minority block. This asymmetry is also reﬂected in the election results. Consult for
example Figure 1. C wins more elections than A and A almost never wins. Supporting actions
of Type III voters in favor of C are more fruitful than supporting actions of Type I voters in
favor of A. The former are more likely to work and hence are used more often by Type III
voters.
NI, as indicated by the signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the corresponding dummy, increases the
probability that Type I voters use Top and Sincere ballots under AV and PV. The signiﬁcant
interactions between the NI dummy and voter type dummies also reveal that the behavioral
response to less available information diﬀers across voter types. Post estimation hypotheses
tests reveal that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the propensity to use Top ballots between
information treatments for both Type II and Type III voters. The same is true for Type II
voters under PV and Sincere ballots.18 The results under AV and PV show that less available
information increases the propensity to cast sincere ballots. Voters vote more sincerely under
PV and use `approve of the most preferred alternative' ballots more often under AV. The
behavioral heterogeneity across voter types in terms of reactions to NI are not as pronounced
under BC as they are under AV or PV. Although we observe a signiﬁcant interaction for Type
II voters and NI, post-estimation test reveal no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the propensity to
cast burying ballots for Type II voters between information treatments (z=1.56, p=0.119). In
general, the behavioral heterogeneity in response to less available information across voter types
suggests that NI reduces the scope of misrepresentations of preferences, but does not eliminate
strategic considerations altogether.
Finally, election histories have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on voting behavior. The Condorcet loser
17 The estimation results from Table 2 are robust against inclusion of a larger set of control variables
(Condorcet winner winning the previous election, measures of how close previous election were, etc). The
corresponding regressions are omitted here and are available upon request. Since the NI dummy is interacted
with the type dummies, the coeﬃcient of the former only measures the eﬀect of NI on Type I voters. The
interaction terms measure whether Type II and Type III voters have a diﬀerent reaction to NI than Type I
voters. The linear combination of, say, the NI coeﬃcient and the interaction coeﬃcient between NI and Type III
voters measures the eﬀect of NI on Type III voters only. Analogous interpretations apply to the type dummies,
the Condorcet loser dummy, and the corresponding interactions. A discussion on interpreting interaction models
can be found in Brambor et al. (2006).
18 Positive z indicate increase in the probability: AV - Type II FI vs NI: z=1.42, p=0.155; Type III FI vs
NI: z=1.55, p=0.120; PV - Type II FI vs NI: z=-0.90, p=0.368.
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winning the previous election signiﬁcantly increases the probability that the minority voters
cast ballots supporting B under all three methods. Type II voters are more likely to approve
of B only, to give B 3 points and bury a competing alternative, and to vote for B if B won the
previous election.19 Type I and Type III voters show a larger probability to double or triple
vote after seeing B win an election. They also use the TopWorst>0 ballot less often in that
event. TopWorst>0 translates into giving more than zero points for B for Type I and Type III
voters. Hence, these voters actively increase the number of approvals for non-B alternatives
under AV and actively decrease the number of points B receives under BC.
In conclusion, the regression analysis corroborates that the two hypothesized channels
of strategic reasoning signiﬁcantly predict behavior of participants in the direction of self-
interested voting decision. This clearly establishes the importance of strategic behavior of the
participants. There also exists stark diﬀerences between AV, PV, and BC. In contrast to the
former two voting methods, the heterogeneity in voting behavior under BC as reactions to the
strategic environment are not as pronounced. Van der Straeten et al. (2010), for example,
show that rational choice theory provides good predictions of actual behavior for AV and PV
elections. However, the authors also show that under more complex voting methods, where
strategic consideration are cognitively demanding, voters tend to rely on simpler heuristics.
BC might be more complex than AV and PV and voters use simpler, heuristic based reactions
to past election histories.
5 Conclusion
This article has reported on the results of a series of experimental, four-alternative elections
in which the induced preference proﬁle in the electorate corresponded to a divided majority
problem. The divided majority was given three possibilities to coordinate their votes on. Two
alternatives represented the most favored alternative of one of the two divided majority blocks.
The third alternative constituted a unique Condorcet winner ranking second in each partici-
pant's preference proﬁle. The preference proﬁle aligned many normative criteria having them
point to a single alternative. The Condorcet winner would also win the Borda Count election
if voters acted sincerely and maximizes the sum of all individual payoﬀs. In a second step,
the experiment manipulated the amount of available information that voters had from a full
information framework where each voter was fully informed about the preference structure in
the whole electorate to an no information framework where voters only knew their own payoﬀs
and the election histories.
The novelty of the design disentangled coordination eﬀectiveness (the Condorcet loser not
winning the election) from coordination eﬃciency (Condorcet winner winning the election),
a distinction that has not gained any attention in the existing literature so far. The main
results of the experiment showed that multi-vote systems like Approval Voting and Borda Count
outperform Plurality Voting in divided majority problems in terms of coordination eﬃciency
in the absence of information about other voter's preferences. The underlying information
structure had a huge impact on election outcomes and individual behavior under Plurality
Voting, even for a ﬁxed set of preferences. At the same time, Approval Voting and Borda
Count were less responsive to changes in the underlying information structure. However, with
enough experience, voters were able to solve the coordination problem across all three methods
in the sense that coordination failure rates were fairly low and the Condorcet loser was often
defeated. The electoral process itself, modeled through a repeated-game structure, provided
voters with enough information allowing them to make good decisions despite their low level of
informdeness. Approval Voting and the Borda Count, by design, give voters the opportunity to
19 Positive z indicate increase in the probability: AV - z=6.98, p <0.001; BC - z=3.28, p=0.001; PV -
z=9.78, p <0.001.
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send much richer and ﬁner ballot messages. They transmitted enough information through their
ballot structures eﬀectively eliminating information imperfections. In this sense, multi-votes
systems allowed voters to make better decisions despite their low level of informdeness.
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A Additional tables
Table 3: Fraction of elections won for each alternative under AV, in percent.
Full Information No Information
A B C D A B C D
SA 2.47 17.23 5.60 74.70 5.34 24.26 8.12 62.28
SA Last 4 3.04 13.45 3.39 80.12 4.86 21.70 7.47 65.97
SA Last 3.47 9.03 3.47 84.03 3.47 23.61 7.64 65.28
S01 2.99 20.18 6.12 70.70 5.21 21.35 8.85 64.58
S01 Last 4 1.82 15.36 3.39 79.43 5.73 26.56 3.65 64.06
S01 Last 4.17 10.42 0.00 85.42 4.17 33.33 4.17 58.33
S02 1.69 14.45 3.78 80.08 2.47 29.04 5.08 63.41
S02 Last 4 2.60 10.42 3.13 83.85 1.04 21.35 4.69 72.92
S02 Last 6.25 6.25 0.00 87.50 0.00 31.25 0.00 68.75
S03 2.73 17.06 6.90 73.31 8.33 22.40 10.42 58.85
S03 Last 4 4.69 14.58 3.65 77.08 7.81 17.19 14.06 60.94
S03 Last 0.00 10.42 10.42 79.17 6.25 6.25 18.75 68.75
N ote: S0X considers the Xth series, SA considers all three series. Also shown are the ﬁgures when considering
only the last four elections of the relevant series or only the very last ones.
23
Table 4: Fraction of elections won for each alternative under BC, in percent.
Full Information No Information
A B C D A B C D
SA 6.51 6.60 13.45 73.44 5.03 9.29 13.80 71.87
SA Last 4 7.29 4.34 11.81 76.56 4.51 9.90 12.33 73.26
SA Last 11.11 7.64 6.25 75.00 9.72 8.33 9.72 72.22
S01 9.11 10.94 23.44 56.51 2.86 17.97 9.90 69.27
S01 Last 4 10.42 6.77 20.83 61.98 4.69 23.44 14.06 57.81
S01 Last 12.50 16.67 10.42 60.42 12.50 25.00 12.50 50.00
S02 5.21 5.21 10.42 79.17 4.69 5.99 13.02 76.30
S02 Last 4 7.29 4.69 7.29 80.73 3.13 3.13 15.63 78.13
S02 Last 16.67 0.00 4.17 79.17 6.25 0.00 12.50 81.25
S03 5.21 3.65 6.51 84.64 7.55 18.49 18.49 70.05
S03 Last 4 4.17 1.56 7.29 86.98 5.73 7.29 7.29 83.85
S03 Last 4.17 6.25 4.17 85.42 10.42 4.17 4.17 85.42
N ote: S0X considers the Xth series, SA considers all three series. Also shown are the ﬁgures when considering
only the last four elections of the relevant series or only the very last ones.
Table 5: Fraction of elections won for each alternative under PV, in percent.
Full Information No Information
A B C D A B C D
SA 7.29 34.90 4.17 53.65 19.10 46.53 25.35 9.03
SA Last 4 12.29 25.42 2.50 59.79 22.92 29.69 29.69 17.71
SA Last 7.50 22.50 5.00 65.00 20.83 29.17 29.17 29.17
S01 6.25 36.20 7.29 50.26 28.12 42.45 24.22 5.21
S01 Last 4 12.50 29.69 6.25 51.56 25.56 34.38 29.69 9.38
S01 Last 6.25 18.75 12.50 62.50 25.00 18.75 31.25 25.00
S02 8.85 49.48 0.00 41.67 3.13 51.56 34.38 10.94
S02 Last 4 14.58 36.46 0.00 48.96 1.56 39.06 37.50 21.88
S02 Last 0.00 50.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 37.50 37.50 25.00
S03 7.55 26.30 3.13 63.02 26.04 45.57 17.45 10.94
S03 Last 4 10.94 15.63 0.00 73.44 40.63 15.63 21.88 21.88
S03 Last 12.50 12.50 0.00 75.00 37.50 6.25 18.75 37.50
N ote: S0X considers the Xth series, SA considers all three series. Also shown are the ﬁgures when considering
only the last four elections of the relevant series or only the very last ones.
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Table 6: Relative frequencies of ballot cast in the experiment in percent.
Type I Type II Type III Total
AVFI AVNI AVFI AVNI AVFI AVNI AVFI AVNI
Top 19.3 37.8 49.5 58.2 25.3 28.4 33.9 43.8
TopTwo 45.3 51.3 32.6 28.6 52.1 54.2 41.8 42.4
TopThree 13.5 6.5 4.0 6.2 6.8 7.6 7.5 6.7
Other 21.9 4.4 13.9 6.9 15.9 9.9 16.7 7.1
Type I Type II Type III Total
BCFI BCNI BCFI BCNI BCFI BCNI BCFI BCNI
Sincere 45.6 45.8 39.1 50.3 42.7 41.4 42.0 46.5
TopWorst>0 16.9 17.7 20.7 26.0 28.4 26.8 21.8 23.9
Second 25.5 25.8 28.0 18.4 20.6 12.0 25.1 18.7
Other 12.0 10.7 12.3 5.2 8.3 19.8 11.1 10.9
Type I Type II Type III Total
PVFI PVNI PVFI PVNI PVFI PVNI PVFI PVNI
Sincere 27.2 64.1 85.2 87.7 31.0 69.8 53.1 75.8
Second 66.6 10.7 12.1 8.9 54.7 10.4 39.8 9.8
Third 4.1 24.2 2.1 1.4 11.3 18.2 5.3 12.7
Other 2.2 1.0 0.6 2.1 3.1 1.6 1.8 1.6
N ote: Categories are mutually exclusive. AV - Top: approve of the most preferred alternative, Top Two:
approve of the two most preferred alternatives, Top Three: approve of the three most preferred alternatives,
Other: remaining ballots; BC - Sincere: sincere ballots, Top Worst>0: ballots in which the most preferred
alternative receives 3 points and the least preferred one receives more than 0 points, Second: ballots in which
alternative D receives 3 points, Other: remaining ballots; PV - Sincere: sincere ballots, Second: ballots cast for
the second most preferred alternative, Third: ballots cast for third most preferred alternative, Other: ballots
cast for the last preferred alternative.
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